"The Secret is to Look Good on Paper”: Appropriating Mobility within and against a Machine of Illegalization by Scheel, Stephan
  
Chapter One 
 Secret is to Look Good on  
Appropriating Mobility within and against a Machine of 
Illegalization 
Stephan Scheel 
 
Reports in the media on spectacular border crossings tend to create the impression that the 
majority of illegalised migrants enter the European Union (EU) clandestinely, hidden in freight 
containers or in unseaworthy boats. It is however by now an established fact that the majority of 
illegalised migrants arrive perfectly legally with a valid Schengen visa in the EU and only become 
illegal  once it has expired (Collyer et al. 2012; Düvell 2011; EC 2003; Schoorl et al. 2000: 101; 
Sciortino 2004; Zampagni 2013).1 The importance of visas as a mode of entry for illegalised 
migrants has also been documented for other destination countries like the United States, where it 
is estimated that so-called   account for 40-50% of the  illegalised 
population of 12 million people (Andreas 2000: 100; Pew Hispanic Center 2006: 3).2 Likewise, 
reports on illegalised migration in the United Kingdom (which is not part of the Schengen area) 
underlines that, contrary to public perception, the vast majority of illegalised people in the UK are 
                                                 
1  In this chapter I use the criminalising terms  migrant or  migration only if the  official 
terminology is unavoidable. In order to highlight the active role that statist institutions play in the processes that make 
people  I will speak of   instead (Bauder 2013). The notion of  migrants thus 
brings to the fore the processes of illegalisation that get concealed by other, apparently politically more correct 
alternative terms like ,   migrant or   (Karakayali 2008). Especially 
in relation to the mode of illegalised migration described in this chapter, these terms occlude more than they reveal as 
migrants enter the EU neither unauthorised, nor clandestine nor    
2 More recent figures suggest that this share might have increased: A report of the DHS (Department for Homeland 
Security) published in January 2016 suggests that in 2015 alone 416.500 people on short-term visas have possibly 
remained in the US after their  admission  expired as the DHS had no record of their departure despite 
data exchange programs with all commercial air and sea travel providers (DHS 2016).
  
non-deported rejected asylum seekers and visa overstayers (Sigona and Hughes 2012: 6). This 
observation has also been confirmed for the global level: The  World Migration report 2010 
emphasizes that most of the 10-15% of the  international migrants who are in an irregular 
situation are, in fact, overstayers (IOM 2010: 29). Yet, neither the importance of restrictive visa 
policies for the illegalisation of migration, nor the significance of visas as a mode of illegalised 
migration have been sufficiently acknowledged by border and migration studies so far.  
This is well reflected by the relative neglect of the Schengen visa regime  which is the 
focus of this chapter  in the border and migration studies literature. The meagre, but growing 
number of publications one finds on the Schengen visa regime sits in stark contrast with the 
attention that more visible aspects of border control like detention centres, deportations, militarised 
border controls under the lead of FRONTEX or interception policies in the Mediterranean have 
received in border, migration and critical security studies. It could indeed be argued that much of 
the research in border and migration studies suffers from the same bias as media coverage and 
public debate which, by focusing on more visible and often dramatic forms of unauthorised border 
crossing and the spectacle of militarised border enforcement,  to generate a constellation of 
images and discursive formations, which repetitively supply migrant  with the 
semblance of an objective  (De Genova 2013: 1830). The relative neglect of the Schengen 
visa regime is the more astonishing given that it affects the access to mobility of billions of people. 
Phenomena like the much debated attempts to cross the Mediterranean in overcrowded boats 
constitute, in fact, nothing but effects of this vast machine of illegalisation which provokes this 
and other dangerous forms of border crossing, as I show in this chapter.  
Moreover, we know virtually nothing about aspiring  attempts to appropriate 
mobility to Europe via Schengen visa and the less spectacular border struggles that occur, on a 
  
daily basis, in the 3.500 visa sections that the  member states maintain worldwide. This 
chapter uses the introduction of the Visa Information System (VIS), one of the largest biometric 
databases in the world, as an occasion to compensate for this twofold gap in the borders and 
migration studies literature. Drawing on the autonomy of migration approach (AoM), I engage the 
Schengen visa regime from the perspective of aspiring migrants in order to investigate how they 
appropriate mobility to Europe via Schengen visa in the context of biometric border controls.3  
This question is raised by the  core thesis. As indicated by its name, the AoM 
suggests that migration features moments of autonomy, that is moments of uncontrollability and 
excess, in relation to the attempts to control and regulate it (cf.  and Karakayali 2007; 
Mezzadra 2011; Moulier Boutang 1993). This claim is in tension with the promotion of biometric 
technologies as adequate means for  the  in traditional methods of border  
(Thomas 2005). What makes biometric recognition systems so attractive for border control 
purposes is their alleged capacity to verify the claimed identity of a person with unpreceded speed 
and accuracy. One purpose of the VIS is for instance to verify that the person seeking to cross the 
 external border is the same to whom a Schengen visa has been issued in the consulate. To 
this end, the fingerprints of all visa holders are captured upon arrival at the  external borders 
and compared to the fingerprint templates that have been created and stored in the VIS when the 
people concerned applied for a visa in the consulate. Thus, the VIS is meant to forestall that 
passports with valid Schengen visa are used by so-called lookalikes i.e. similarly looking persons 
                                                 
3 What distinguishes the AoM from other approaches in border and migration studies is that it makes  
practices the starting and focal point of any investigation of border regimes or migratory processes (Moulier Boutang 
2007). Due to this strategic-analytical prioritisation of  practices, the AoM is particularly attuned to  
struggles over the appropriation of mobility and other resources within and against  border regimes. Hence, 
proponents of the AoM understand migration as a political expression in itself  and Karakayali 2007; 
Mezzadra 2011; Papadopoulos et al. 2008). With this impetus the AoM was introduced as an alternative to the 
  discourse in debates of the anti-racist movement in the 1990s (for a more detailed disucssion of the 
AoM's features and relevant debates see: Scheel 2013a).
  
(Broeders 2007). What this example demonstrates is that the VIS forecloses some of the practices 
by which migrants could so far successfully appropriate mobility to Europe. Hence, the 
introduction of the VIS raises the question, how migrants appropriate mobility to Europe via 
Schengen visa in the context of biometric border controls? 
To engage this question provides me, and this is the second contribution this chapter seeks 
to make, with the opportunity to introduce the notion of appropriation as an alternative concept to 
theorise  capacity to subvert border controls. To this end, I will identify six features that 
practices of appropriation share irrespective of their form. The need for such an alternative concept 
resides in the limitations of the two concepts that are usually invoked in border and migration 
studies to theorise migran  capacity to challenge governmental attempts to control and regulate 
their behaviour. These are the concepts of agency and resistance. 
This twofold objective is reflected in the  structure. In the first two sections I show 
that the Schengen visa regime constitutes, from the viewpoint of aspiring migrants, an 
unpredictable regime of institutionalised distrust that renders mobility to Europe a scarce resource. 
The Schengen visa regime emerges as a machine of illegalisation that entices multiple practices of 
appropriation and thus the very practices it is meant to forestall. In the third section I elaborate on 
one set of practices by which migrants appropriate Schengen visa in context of the VIS. After 
outlining the central shortcomings of the two concepts that are usually invoked to theorise 
 capacity to defy border controls, I use this example to illustrate six features that practices 
of appropriation feature irrespective of their form. 
The following account of the Schengen visa regime and practices of appropriation is based 
on ethnographic fieldwork that I have conducted in and around consulates of Schengen member 
states in a North African country. During two field visits in 2012 I observed all phases of the visa 
  
application and decision-making procedures in a consulate to which I refer in the following only 
as consulate Z. The reason is that field access was tied to the promise to use the information 
obtained only in a way that enables neither the consulate nor the country where the research was 
conducted to be identified. These participant observations have been complemented by interviews 
with visa applicants, consular staff and heads of mission of other consulates. 
 
Making mobility to Europe an exclusive affair:  
The visa regime as a machine of illegalisation  
  are like  what are we waiting  an old woman shouts angrily. Together with 
dozens of other visa applicants she has been waiting since seven  in the morning outside a 
large visa section to have her fingerprints taken in order to enrol in VIS. For most people in the 
queue it is the second day of their visa application. In an attempt to rid itself of the bad image 
created by queues in front of its buildings in the middle of the capital, the visa section, which 
receives a large proportion of visa applications in the country in question, has outsourced the 
lodging of visa applications to a private company. Following the instructions on the  
homepage, most applicants arrange an appointment at the  offices, located in a 
prosperous business district out of town, to submit their application for an additional fee of 25 
Euros. If their file is complete and none of the required documents are missing, applicants receive 
an appointment to have their fingerprints taken at the consulate the next day. Many visa applicants 
regard the new procedure as confusing and complicated. As a surgeon working in a private clinic 
explains, the visa application procedure is a nuisance for him primarily because it is so time-
consuming. The income he loses because he cannot work for two days is more significant to him 
than the additional fees he has to pay to the private company. Hoping to resume his work at the 
  
clinic as soon as possible, he has arrived three hours early for his appointment, like many others 
who are waiting on the small street behind the consulate. Lorries on their way to the nearby market 
sound their horns angrily at the waiting people as they try to pass the crowd that almost blocks the 
road. After 15 minutes and plenty of shouting, the two security officers guarding the consulate 
entrance bring the waiting crowd back in line. 
 What this account illustrates is that the visa application procedure is not only time-
consuming and expensive, but is also a daunting experience for applicants, a point that has been 
greatly emphasised by the existing literature on the Schengen visa regime (Bigo and Guild 2003; 
CIMADE 2010; Infantino 2013; Maschino 2008; Zampagni 2011). Less has been written about 
the many people who never join one of the queues in front of the 3,500 consular posts Schengen 
member states maintain worldwide because they cannot meet the manifold requirements an 
applicant needs to fulfil to receive one of the precious entry tickets to Europe. 
 Each day during my research I encountered people who told me they had never applied for 
a Schengen visa or had tried once only to be rejected. One morning, while I was asking people in 
the queue described above for an interview, a young man approached me and asked me for advice. 
His name was Mohamed.4 He explained to me that he had recently tried to apply for a Schengen 
visa only to be chased away by the guards in front of the consulate. Laughing at him, they had told 
Mohamed that his visa application would be refused anyway, advising him to come back in a 
couple of years when he had found a job and started a family.  can I not go to Europe? Why 
can I not go to [name of country represented by the consulate] to learn about the culture and get to 
know the people? I have studied European culture and philosophy, so why can I not go there now 
to get to know it first hand? What do I have to do to get a  I had no ready reply. I just 
                                                 
4 All names in this chapter have been changed.
  
confirmed what the guards had already told him: his visa application would certainly be rejected 
because as a young student without a stable financial income he embodied a high   
in the eyes of consular staff. Each day I encountered numerous others who, unlike Mohamed, had 
not even dared to apply for a Schengen visa because they  what the guards had told him: 
they had no realistic chance of being granted a visa. Tarek, a cab driver, had a brother living in 
Europe but had never tried to visit him because  would never give me a  Walid, a young 
servant working in the hotel where I was staying, had learned from failed attempts by friends that 
applying for a visa was  a waste of time and  
 The accounts of Mohamed, Tarek, Walid and countless others highlight that it is the very 
rationale of the Schengen visa regime to render mobility to Europe a scarce resource. This is far 
from surprising, since  a division between good and bad circulation, and maximising the 
good circulation by minimising the  (Foucault 2007: 18) is the raison  of this vast security 
dispositif. In practice, the Schengen visa regime restricts foreign  access to the EU by 
introducing an entry ticket, a Schengen visa, receipt of which is subject to conditions that a 
significant share of the population cannot fulfil and that often do not correspond to local 
circumstances. People like Mohamed, Tarek and Walid are excluded from registration and 
documentation with a Schengen visa through a  of  they cannot provide and a set 
of requirements they cannot fulfil (Broeders 2011: 59). This is why the Schengen visa regime 
constitutes a Paper Curtain  (Lavenex and Uçarer 2004: 433) for many citizens from the 124 
countries that are subjected to a visa requirement, as shown on the map below.5 
                                                 
5 These 124 countries include all African and most Asian states (with the exception of Japan, Malaysia and South 
Korea) as well as a four South American states plus Belize, Cuba and Jamaica in the Caribbean (Council 2001) For a 
map refer to official webpage of the DG Migration and Home Affairs of the European Commission: http:// 
ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/visa-policy/index_en.htm (01.05.2015).
  
For instance, consulate  instruction leaflet enumerates no less than ten different types 
of documents applicants must provide for a tourist visa: a valid passport, bank statements for the 
past 12 months, proof of means of subsistence (88 euros per person per day) or a declaration from 
a host that they will cover costs, a holiday request signed by the employer, an employment contract, 
salary slips for the past three months, a social security card, a print-out of social security 
contributions, travel insurance for all Schengen member states and a reservation for a return ticket. 
Together with the costs of the visa application itself (fees, travel and accommodation in the 
capital), the cost of providing these documents easily amounts to the average monthly income in 
the country I visited (cf. Zampagni 2011). Moreover, providing some of these documents may 
prove impossible for many people, as they do not reflect the working and living conditions of a 
large share of the population. In the context of a large informal economy, cab drivers like Walid 
may not have a bank account or pay social security contributions (Alpes 2011: 116-117). That the 
paper requirements for a Schengen visa are often removed from local realities is also admitted by 
J, who works at an embassy harbouring one of the largest visa sections in the country I visited. In 
the context of a large informal economy, even very rich business people find it difficult to provide 
documents confirming their wealth, J tells me. The same applies to farmers, who cannot provide 
evidence of the land they own due to incomplete registers, she adds.  
But even if they provide all the requested documents, people like Mohamed, Tarek or 
Walid will not be issued a tourist visa by any of the consulates I have visited, because they do not 
meet the informal requirements that guide consular  decisions. The head of the visa section 
at consulate Z, for instance, considers any application for a tourist visa dubious, because the 
member state he represents  certainly not the most attractive tourist destination in  
Hence, he only issues tourist visas to people who have previously visited Europe and have a 
  
permanent job with a significant income. Likewise, the head of a visa section that does, in fact, 
represent an attractive tourist destination, boasts in an interview:  who does not earn at 
least double the average monthly income will not get a visa from  By setting requirements for 
a visa that the majority of the local population cannot fulfil, the Schengen visa regime subjects 
Mohamed, Tarek, Walid and countless others to the paradoxical freedom of the ban  go 
anywhere except where one wants to  (Bigo 2007: 26). 
But since people  not decide to stay put just because the receiving state says they are 
not  (Castles 2004: 209), the Schengen visa regime operates, in effect, as a vast machine 
of illegalisation. This becomes apparent if one recalls that boat migration from North African 
coasts only became a significant phenomenon after Spain imposed visa requirements on nationals 
of all African and Arab countries in 1991 in order to meet the accession criteria for the Schengen 
area (Carling 2007: 11, 22; de Haas 2008: 1307). People like Mohamed, Tarek and Walid have, in 
fact, only two options at their disposal to contest their banishment from Europe through highly 
restrictive visa requirements: Either they try to appropriate mobility via Schengen visa through 
practices that involve the clandestine transgression of these strict regulations, or they bypass the 
Schengen visa regime altogether by engaging in more dangerous modes of clandestine border 
crossing, which are often facilitated by  who overcharge their clients for their services. 
Peter Andreas makes a similar observation in regards to the aggressive border enforcement 
policies which have been pursued at the US-Mexico border since the 1990s. One crucial effect of 
the upscaling of border controls is that it pushes aspiring migrants  like restrictive requirements 
for a Schengen visa   a wider web of  (Andreas 1998: 348), thus provoking the very 
phenomena tough border enforcement is supposed to forestall. In case of the US-Mexican border, 
 tactics of appropriation have developed from practices of -  to more 
  
clandestine forms of border-crossing that often involve the services of -organized, binational 
people-smuggling  (ibid). In case of the Schengen visa regime, it is a set of highly 
restrictive formal and informal requirements that efficiently bars a significant share of the local 
population from applying for a Schengen visa in the first place, which compels aspiring migrants 
to engage in criminalised practices, such as  document fraud  or unauthorised border 
crossings, in order to appropriate mobility within and against a complex security dispositif whose 
very logic is to make mobility to Europe a scarce resource. By enticing this   (Garcia 
1997), the Schengen visa regime generates this and other forms of  like illegalised 
migration in unseaworthy boats across the Mediterranean, which are subsequently invoked as 
evidence by border control authorities for the alleged need to introduce more and better security 
technologies, a dynamic that I describe in the next section.  
 
At the Consulate:  
Encountering an unpredictable regime of institutionalised distrust 
 Yet, the Schengen visa regime entices not only -  like Mohamed, Tarek and 
Walid to engage in criminalised practices like the manipulation of supporting documents, but also 
people who are able to provide the requested documents that are needed to submit a visa 
application procedure in the first place. The reason is that also for those who fulfil the formal 
criteria for a Schengen visa the outcome of their application is highly uncertain as they are faced 
with an unpredictable regime of institutionalised distrust. 
Given that it is very raison  of the Schengen visa regime to reflect and deflect the 
mobility of potential migrants, while facilitating the mobility of   travellers, it is not 
surprising that many of the visa applicants I interviewed reported that they felt mistrusted and 
  
disbelieved by consular staff. This widely shared experience results from the fact that visa 
applicants enter the consulates of Schengen member states as  (Bigo and Guild 2003: 
93), as the following account from consulate Z confirms. 
  when have you worked for this  the employee at consulate Z asks through 
the Plexiglas window.  three months  replies the woman, who has increasing difficulty 
holding her young child on her arm. She and her ten year old daughter standing beside her have 
been in front of the counter for more than half an hour. They look intimidated and strained.  
are very  says the employee with a cynical inflection.     are most 
 replies the employee in an overfriendly voice, while she types under the rubric  
in the electronic file:  the unusually high income the applicant purports to have received for 
three months   
After they have left, a young woman approaches the counter. She has completed a  
degree in English at a local university and is applying for a visa to take up an internship with an 
NGO working with people with special needs.  did you find this   do you 
want to work for this   this the first time you have applied for a Schengen  While 
the women replies  to the last question, the employee writes in the  section:  
that the education of the applicant has nothing to do with her envisaged internshi  When I ask 
the employee why she has entered this unfavourable judgment, she replies that the young woman 
has just finished her studies and is  looking for work.  visa application will 
probably be  she concludes. 
  
This account offers a glimpse of the culture of institutionalised distrust that reigns in the 
consulates of Schengen countries.6 Institutionalised distrust has frequently been identified as a 
central feature of the visa application procedure (Alpes and Spire 2014; Bigo and Guild 2003; 
CIMADE 2010; Infantino and Rea 2012). The latter has been described as a bureaucratic process 
in which  by  (Zampagni 2013: 96) is regarded as  sign of  
(Alpes 2011: 125).  
In the following I demonstrate, however, that this culture of distrust is not created by 
instances of  (Alpes and Spire 2014: 167), though it is certainly animated by them. Rather, 
it is already inscribed in the Schengen visa  risk management approach. This is reflected 
in the Community Code on Visas (CCV), the legal basis for the Schengen visa regime. Article 21 
states that the principal objective of the visa application procedure is to   whether the 
applicant presents a risk of illegal immigration or a risk to the security of the Member States and 
whether the applicant intends to leave the territory of the Member States before the expiry of the 
visa applied  (EP and Council 2009b: 12; emphasis added). Through this clause, the mere wish 
to travel to the Schengen area becomes the subject of general suspicion. Consequently, the 
assumption of innocence is reversed in the visa application procedure: consular staff always start 
from the negative and it is the applicant who has to convince consular staff that she does not intend 
to migrate. It is thus the notion of risk itself that creates a culture of institutionalised distrust in 
Schengen visa regime consulates. 
In this context it should be noted that the notion of risk constitutes an indispensable element 
of the operational logic of the Schengen visa regime. It is through its evaluation in terms of risk 
                                                 
6 The notion of a culture of institutionalised distrust is inspired by studies of the British asylum system, which invoke 
a  of  to grasp the generalised suspicion asylum seekers are confronted with throughout the processing 
of their claims (e.g. Griffiths 2012).
  
that the entire population of a given country is rendered as suspect. It is thus the notion of risk 
which allows to subject those wishing to move to in-depth control in their country of departure 
and before they have started to move. This dislocation of border controls in both space and time 
constitutes, in a nutshell, the raison  of the Schengen visa regime, as a report for the EMN 
confirms:  visa policy is a tool of which the EU and the Member States avail themselves in 
an attempt to control the mobility of third country nationals prior to their entry into the country, 
i.e. extra-  (Parusel and Schneider 2012: 5; emphasis added). During this control 
process, applicants have to prove through the answers they provide in an interview and the 
documents they furnish as evidence for their answers that they, contrary to the general suspicion 
that led to the imposition of a visa requirement in the first place, do not pose a  or 
urity  A culture of institutionalised distrust at consulates is therefore as integral to the 
operational logic of the Schengen visa regime as the notion of risk itself. 
But how do consular staff  the   of an applicant in order to fulfil the 
core objective of the visa application procedure and what are the criteria upon which this 
 is based? The answer in brief is that consular staff do not so much assess but rather 
ascribe a migration risk to a visa applicant, based on informal criteria that vary from one visa 
section to the next. It is thus no miracle that many applicants judge the decision-making as arbitrary 
and unfair (Alpes 2011; Bigo and Guild 2003; CIMADE 2010; Infantino 2013). What underpins 
these widely shared perceptions is that the Schengen visa regime is, in fact, unpredictable in 
regards to its decision-making procedure and its outcomes. This unpredictability derives from the 
discretionary power of consular staff in conjunction with the visa  risk management 
approach, which introduces an irreducible moment of interpretation in the decision-making 
procedure, as I am going to explain now. 
  
Whenever I asked consular staff how they decide on visa applications I received the same 
evasive answer as Alexis Spire (2009: 80) in his seminal study on French migration 
administrations:  a case by case  The head of the visa section in consulate Z (hereafter: 
M) defended this case-by-case approach as  arguing that it would grant consular staff 
the  that is necessary to assess each case  What this justification of consular 
  in the decision-making indicates is that discretion constitutes an indispensable 
element of the operational logic of the Schengen visa regime. Discretion is an irreducible  of 
the reality of policy  because it permits street-level-bureaucrats working on the 
frontline to adapt abstract laws and regulations to individual cases and local circumstances 
(Bouchard and Carroll 2002: 242; Lipsky 1980: 16). Consular staff often emphasised that the 
definition of any clear-cut decision criteria would prove to be impossible. Since  dossier is 
 as they put it, consular staff have to interpret it to adapt it to the general provisions of 
abstract laws and regulations. It is thus the task to  the   of a visa applicant, 
the practical implementation of article 21 of the legal basis of the Schengen visa regime (EP and 
Council 2009b), that introduces an irreducible moment of interpretation in the decision-making 
procedure. And it is this irreducible moment of interpretation, which is inherent to any assessment 
of risk, that makes the decision-making procedure unpredictable for visa applicants as it results in 
the application of decision criteria that vary from one consulate to the next. 
For consular  decision-making praxis is shaped by a local practical knowledge that 
varies across visa sections. The reason is that the notion of   does not only create 
uncertainty for visa applicants, but also for consular staff. The task of  the  
 posed by an applicant compels consular staff to make decisions under conditions of time-
constraint, incomplete information and uncertainty.  cannot look inside   a 
  
senior official responsible for visa policy at a foreign ministry admits in an interview. Since 
consular staff have no direct access to visa  intentions, their  of an 
applic    is based primarily on interpretation. But this interpretation does not 
occur in a void. It is shaped by practical knowledge and informal decision-making criteria that 
circulate among consular staff in the form of stories about legendary cases which function as 
reference points for consular  decisions, as illustrated by the following example. 
 applicant shows the profile of a young person from a deprived area in the South who 
seeks to establish relationships with tourists, enabling him to apply for a visa to Europe. A possible 
marriage cannot be ruled  This is one of the many entries by counter staff at consulate Z that 
features the notions of risk  and  It illustrates that consular staff interpret a particular 
combination of certain biographical features as indicators of the presence or absence of  
 But this example equally shows that these interpretations are shaped by local practical 
knowledge that surfaces in the form of prototype cases. Consular staff  the   
of an applicant by looking for patterns in the biographical features and narratives of visa applicants 
in order to allocate them to one of the  of these prototype cases. In this instance, it is the 
appli  age, origin and social class and relationship to his host which serve as indicators for 
  as they correspond to  profile of a young person from a deprived area in the 
South who seeks to establish relationships with tourists, enabling him to apply for a visa to 
7  
                                                 
7 For the prominence of the notions of  and  in the judgments of consular staff in other consulates see 
the works of Federica Infantino and Andrea Rea (2012) and Francesca Zampagni (2013: 95-97). This is no 
coincidence, since an EC handbook on the processing of visa applications explicitly invites consulates to  
 of applicants presenting a specific risk  (EC 2010: 65). Yet, the handbook neither defines what a 
 is, nor does it outline procedures for how a  should be drawn up. Moreover, the role of these  
in the decision-making procedure remains entirely unclear as  each individual application shall be assessed on its 
own merits irrespective of possible  having been drawn  (ibid.).
  
Hence, consular  decisions are not arbitrary because they are bestowed with a relative 
coherency by the informal decision-making criteria that circulate among consular staff in the form 
of advice and stories about legendary cases that are subsequently codified as informal  
and  of applicants. This local practical knowledge about certain  and  of 
applicants is then mobilised by consular staff to negotiate the uncertainty that the task of 
 the   of an applicant generates for them. Together with a culture of 
institutionalised distrust and a shared ethos among consular staff, who tend to regard themselves 
as protectors of national identity and defenders of the welfare state (Infantino and Rea 2012: 74; 
Spire 2009: 58-60), it is this local practical knowledge which imbues consular  decision-
making with a relative coherency. 
While this relative coherency explains, why consular  decisions are not arbitrary, 
their decisions remain, nevertheless, unpredictable for applicants for three reasons. First, there 
remains a variance within the relative coherence of the decision-making praxis in each visa section 
due to the discretionary power of consular staff (Spire 2009: 61-79). Second, the informal criteria 
and prototype cases that inform consular  decisions are not known to visa applicants. Finally, 
decisions on visa applications remain unpredictable because the practical knowledge, which 
bestows consular  decision-making praxis with a certain coherency within one visa section, 
varies from one consulate to the next. 
For instance, M explains to me that he would never issue a visa to a widowed woman 
wanting to visit her grandchildren in Europe,  the risk is too high that she stays with her 
 He conceives this case as a -win-  Following  reasoning, the widowed 
woman has an interest in staying in Europe, because she would no longer be alone. The family 
would in turn welcome her stay, because the grandmother could look after their children. The head 
  
of another visa section argues, in contrast, that he would always issue a visa in such cases, if the 
inviting family could sustain the applicant financially, because n old woman does not do the 
economy any harm, no matter whether she stays or  What this example illustrates is that the 
local practical knowledge informing consular   of an   
 varies considerably from one consulate to the next, rendering their decisions unpredictable 
for visa applicants.  
Ironically, it is then the risk management approach of the Schengen visa regime and the 
attempt to render uncertain future behaviours predictable and governable, which make the 
decision-taking procedure unpredictable and its outcome uncertain for visa applicants. Yet, the 
uncertainty that this unpredictability of the decision-making procedure creates for visa applicants 
 not equal for  (Alpes 2011: 120). Those who primarily regard the visa application 
procedure as a time-consuming nuisance, like the surgeon in the queue, are those who can be 
relatively certain of getting a visa because their  corresponds to that of a bona fide traveller. 
A second group of people, like Mohamed, Tarek and Walid, can in turn be certain that they will 
not be granted a visa as long as they play by the rules that render them ineligible for an entry ticket 
to Europe. But for a significant share of people the result of their visa application is highly 
uncertain due to a bureaucratic process that is unpredictable in regards to its outcomes because of 
the irreducible moment of interpretation that decision-making by consular staff involves and the 
opacity and variability of the informal criteria they deploy to  the alleged   
of an applicant. 
Practices like applying at a consulate that has a reputation for being less  than the 
representation of the member state that constitutes an  travel destination, or concealing 
biographical features that may be interpreted as an indicator of a   by consular staff, 
  
such as family ties in Europe, are prosecuted as   and instances of 8 And they 
are represented as such by border control authorities, who cite them as evidence for the alleged 
need to tame the excessive agency of visa applicants through ever more pervasive security 
technologies like biometrics. However, from the viewpoint of those wishing to move, these and 
other practices of appropriation constitute indispensable tactics that are necessary in order to 
negotiate the uncertainty that the visa application procedure generates for them. It is thus the 
culture of distrust that reigns in the consulates of Schengen member states in conjunction with the 
opacity and variability of the informal criteria used by consular staff in their decision-making that 
prompt people willing to move to engage in practices of appropriation in the hope of increasing 
the prospects of success for their visa application. 
Yet, the introduction of the biometric database VIS, which is meant to serve the EU as a 
multipurpose tool in its self-proclaimed  against illegal  (EC 2006), forestalls 
some of the practices by which people willing to move could previously successfully appropriate 
mobility to Europe via Schengen visa. It is for instance no longer possible to hand on passports 
with valid Schengen visa to lookalikes  as indicated in the introduction. It is also no longer 
possible to use stolen blank visa stickers or to manipulate the content of visa-stickers in a way that 
permits the re-use of a visa either by the person to whom it was issued or by another person. If no 
corresponding file exists in the VIS, it is very likely that the person concerned will be denied entry 
upon arrival at the external borders of the Schengen area. For border guards do not only use the 
                                                 
8 The pejorative term of   refers, first, to practice of visa applicants to lodge further applications at 
consulates of one or several other Schengen member states after an initial application has already been turned down, 
and second, to the practice of lodging an application at the consulate of another member state than the one that is 
responsible for processing the application. Following article 5 of the Community Code on Visa (CCV), applicants are 
required to apply for a Schengen visa at the consulate of the member state that constitutes  main destination of the 
visit(s) in terms of length or purpose of  (EP and Council 2009b: 6).
  
VIS to verify that the person seeking to cross the border is the same to whom the visa has been 
issued, but also to retrieve extensive data on the traveller and her visa application from the database 
in order to compare it to the information on the visa sticker.9 Finally, the VIS permits consular 
staff to detect the lodging of several visa applications at different Schengen consulates, because 
they can now check, as a senior border guard put it,  this fingerprint has already applied for a 
10 Hence, the introduction of the VIS raises the question, how people willing to move can 
still appropriate mobility to Europe via Schengen visa in the context of biometric border controls. 
 
Appropriating mobility to Europe via Schengen visa:  
Real, fake, fakingly real or real fake? 
 During my fieldwork at consulates in North Africa I encountered various ways of 
appropriating Schengen visas. Due to space constraints, I am only able to present one mode of 
appropriation here that involves the provision of manipulated or falsified supporting documents. I 
will use this example to outline six features that practices of appropriation share irrespective of 
their form. The aim is to introduce the notion of appropriation as an alternative concept to theorise 
migrants  capacity to subvert border controls and defy migration policy objectives.  
The need for such an alternative concept resides in the shortcomings of the two concepts 
that are usually invoked in border and migration studies to grasp  capacity to challenge 
and subvert border controls. These are the concepts of agency and resistance. The main problem 
                                                 
9 An amendment to the Schengen Border Code prescribes the verification of the fingerprints of all visa holders upon 
entry as mandatory (EP and Council 2009a).
10 To this end, also the fingerprint templates and biographical information of all persons whose visa applications have 
been rejected are stored in the VIS for a period of five years. Following articles 8(2) and 15 of the VIS-regulation (EP 
and Council 2008) and article 21(2) of the CCV (EP and Council 2009b), consular staff have to conduct a search in 
the VIS with the  fingerprints in order to forestall this form of   
  
with the concept of agency is that agency, understood as  socioculturally mediated capacity to 
 (Ahearn 2001: 112), always presupposes a structure as its counterpart. The result of this 
structure-agency divide is a static analysis in which structures and individual and collective forms 
of agency are analysed separately and consecutively (for a more detailed account of this argument 
see: Scheel 2013b). What the notion of agency thus fails to capture is what we often find on the 
ground: An intricate entanglement of practices of government and subversion. The notion of 
resistance is in turn problematic because resistance is an inherently reactive concept: it suggests 
an already existing formation of domination that is to be opposed in a reactive manner. Due to its 
conception as a   (Rose 2002: 387), the notion of resistance fails to register the 
constitutive role that practices of contestation by the governed play in the transformation of 
regimes of government (O'Malley et al. 1997). In the following I will thus introduce the notion of 
appropriation as an alternative concept that transcends the limitations of   and  
indicated here. 
During my second visit to consulate Z, a woman applies for a family reunification visa to 
join her husband, who is already living in Europe. The supporting documents she needs to provide 
to obtain a long-term national D visa are even more comprehensive than those demanded for a 
Schengen visa.11 Instead of the   to  the socioeconomic situation of her 
spouse is decisive for the positive outcome of her application. Following the laws of the country 
represented by consulate Z, staff must be assured that the applicant will 'not become a burden for 
the welfare state', as an employee formulates it. Besides a marriage certificate, the woman has to 
                                                 
11   is the official term for a visa that allows its holder for staying beyond the maximum period of 90 days of a 
Schengen visa (officially referred to as   in the Schengen area. Though issuing D visas falls within the sole 
competence of member states and is not regulated by EU-legislation, there are no differences concerning application 
and decision procedures (Infantino and Rea 2012). While data for D visas is not stored in the VIS, many member 
states have begun to capture of biometric data of applicants for D visas in national databases since the necessary 
infrastructure is already in place due to the VIS.
  
provide evidence that her husband can sustain her and their children financially and that his 
apartment is spacious enough to accommodate them. Q, a counter official, flips through the 
supporting documents the woman has passed through the hatch beneath the Plexiglas window in 
separate plies.   payslips are too old. Is he still employed?' When the woman replies 
that he is not, Q advises her to refrain from lodging her application. The woman seems puzzled: 
'Why do you not want to give me a visa? I have given you three payslips, as stated in the leaflet 
on your homepage.' Q patiently explains that it is not the correct number of payslips that is decisive 
for the outcome of her application, but credible evidence that her husband receives sufficient 
income to sustain her financially. The woman leaves close to tears. 
Shortly afterwards she returns to Q's counter, accompanied by the security officer guarding 
the entrance. She wants to know why Q is refusing to process her application. 'I have only politely 
advised you not to lodge your application because it will probably be rejected. If you insist, I am 
happy to process your applicat  The woman asks Q to write down how many and what kind 
of documents are missing for a successful application. Q replies that it is not his job to solve her 
problems. The woman insists: 'So if I bring you three more payslips, then you will give me the 
visa?' Q becomes loud: 'No! It is not about the payslips, but that your husband has to receive a 
stable income so you can prove he can sustain you financially! You have just told me that your 
husband is out of work at the moment. So do you want to forge the documents or what?' 
While we do not know if this is what the woman had in mind, many applicants do, in fact, 
resort to falsifying and manipulating supporting documents like employment contracts and social 
security records. As explained in the previous section, this   (Garcia 1997; Spire 2009: 
56) is provoked by a highly restrictive visa regime that sets requirements for a Schengen visa that 
do not correspond to the living realities of a large share of the local population. What the encounter 
  
described above indicates is the contested status of the supporting documents. For consular staff 
like Q, payslips and other supporting documents constitute a device of control for the verification 
of the socioeconomic situation of applicants and their hosts. Article 21 of the CCV stipulates: 'The 
examination of an application shall be based notably on the authenticity and reliability of the 
documents submitted and on the veracity and reliability of the statements made by the applicant' 
(EP and Council 2009b: 12). The example of the woman shows, in turn, that applicants primarily 
regard the requested supporting documents as obstacles to be negotiated in order to receive an 
entry ticket to the Schengen area. From their perspective, the falsification and manipulation of 
supporting documents like payslips and bank statements constitutes an attempt to repurpose these 
devices of control into means for appropriating mobility. 
Hence, the first feature of practices of appropriation is that they operate through the 
recoding of the actors, methods and effects of control into means of appropriation. This capacity 
of migrants stems from the logic of contemporary border regimes to make people willing to move 
and when on the move complicit in the control of their mobility. Migrants are implicated in the 
control of their mobility not only as passive objects, but also as acting subjects, because the 
capacity of border regimes to regulate human mobility derives from, but also hinges on, the active 
participation of those whose mobility they are designed to govern. Supporting documents like bank 
statements or social security records are requested by the consulate, but they are provided by the 
visa applicant. This distribution of the capacity to act in  embodied encounters with 
border control authorities (Scheel 2013b) also surfaces in the fact that it is Q, the employee of 
consulate Z, who asks the woman in front of her counter questions in order to assess her eligibility 
for a family reunification visa, but it is woman who provides the answers and is thus able to 
influence the outcome of Q  assessment. It is the active involvement of people on the move in the 
  
government of their mobility which implies that migrants can articulate their capacity to act in 
ways, which convert the means, methods and practices of mobility control into mechanisms which 
allow for its appropriation. 
This observation indicates the second shared feature of practices of appropriation: they are 
inseparably intertwined with the actors, means, methods, operational logics and effects of mobility 
control. What aspiring migrants and travellers try to achieve through the provision of falsified or 
manipulated supporting documents is to transform the functional overdetermination of the 
Schengen visa regime into a pathway to mobility. This functional overdetermination resides in in 
its multiple  of promoting exchanges among civil society, of meeting the demand for 
skilled labour, of attracting investment and business without enhancing the risk of irregular 
migration' (Parusel and Schneider 2012: 45).  
While applicants do not know the criteria that guide consular  decision-making, they 
do nevertheless have a sense of these criteria. How and where to get a visa is a topic of intense 
debate in the country I visited, precisely because people are confronted with an unpredictable 
regime of institutionalised distrust. Hence, a superficial knowledge of consular  informal 
decision-making criteria circulates in the form of rumours and stories about people whose 
applications have either been refused or accepted by a particular consulate. These stories and 
rumours mirror the local practical knowledge consular staff mobilise to cope with the uncertainty 
generated by the risk management approach. While consular staff use stories about prototype cases 
as reference points for their decisions, visa applicants infer the  of these prototype cases 
from rumours about successful visa applications. Due to these rumours, aspiring migrants sense 
that they have to provide evidence that they have 'something to lose', 'something to return to' in 
their country of origin if they want to convince consular staff of their 'will to return'. Hence, many 
  
applicants falsify supporting documents or manipulate their content in such a way that the fictitious 
biographies these documents support correspond to the perceived  of a bona fide traveller: 
'The secret is to look good on paper,' Anas (the teacher whom I met outside a large visa-section) 
aptly summarizes this tactic of appropriation. 
These features highlight that the notion of appropriation captures  better than the concepts 
of  and   the intricate entanglement of practices of government and control 
with those of subversion and contestation that we often find on the ground. Instead of obscuring 
this intricate entanglement through a static analysis that engages  and  in 
isolation from one another, the notion of appropriation invites scholars to investigate, first, how 
migrants try to repurpose and recode the actors, devices and methods of mobility control into 
means of appropriation, to show, second, how this capacity derives from the feature of the 
mechanisms of control to enlist people in the surveillance and regulation of their mobility. 
The reason why we encounter, rather than open confrontation, an intricate entanglement of 
practices of control and subversion in the context of migration are the highly asymmetrical power 
relations at sites of border control. At consulates, visa applicants must behave within the narrow 
parameters set by this securitising site: they must provide all the requested documents, answer all 
questions asked by consular staff and  since VIS began operation  have their fingerprints taken. 
A refusal to comply with any of these regulations results in the automatic refusal of a visa. It is 
these highly asymmetrical power relations that explain why, rather than openly contesting 
restrictive border regimes, migrants usually try recode the mechanisms of control into means of 
appropriation. And it is these highly asymmetrical power relations that compel migrants to execute 
this recoding secretly and unnoticed if their attempts are to be successful. Practices of 
appropriation, then, constitute both an 'art' (de Certeau 1984: 37) and a 'weapon of the weak' (Scott 
  
1985). Since practices of appropriation operate  like the tactics described by Michel de Certeau 
(1984)  in an environment they do not own, remaining undetected, and this is their third shared 
feature, is a precondition of success for practices of appropriation.12 
For consular staff are, of course, aware of attempts to appropriate visas through the 
provision of falsified or manipulated supporting documents. Applicants who provide self-
fabricated documents run the highest risk of being detected. Consular staff reported documents 
containing clumsily scanned stamps or apparently altered names. This shows that appropriating 
Schengen visa by staging a fictitious biography backed-up by manipulated or falsified feeder 
documents demands skills, knowledge and social contacts which not all people possess. 
These failed attempts also points out that the recoding of the actors, mechanisms and 
methods of control into means of appropriation involves the clandestine transgression of the 
norms, official regulations and informal rules of contemporary border regimes. Through the 
clandestine transgression of the parameters of legitimate behaviour laid out for them, and this is 
the fourth feature of practices of appropriation, migrants initiate a relation of irreconcilable conflict 
between migration and the attempts to regulate it. For consular staff regard  attempts to 
appropriate visa through falsified or manipulated supporting documents as nothing but document 
fraud  Each instance of  which is detected is taken as confirmation of the need for constant 
vigilance since staff are dealing with  [who] use all sorts of tricks to get a  as M put 
it. This relation of conflict manifests in dialogues of action between migrants who try to 
                                                 
12 Migration from North African coasts to European islands constitutes a noteworthy exception to this rule, as it 
involves being  by the coastguard  i.e. recoding these actors of mobility control into a means enabling its 
appropriation  and spending some time in detention camps on the island before being transferred to the European 
mainland. But once there, the success of the appropriation of mobility hinges again on remaining undetected and 
avoiding attracting any attention. For migrants usually disappear to lead a life under conditions of illegality and 
collectively organised invisibility (Carling 2007; Papadopoulos et al. 2008). Moreover, the recent deal between the 
EU and the Turkish government that foresees the direct return of migrants arriving on Greek islands back to Turkey 
suggests that remaining undetected is again becoming a precondition of success for the appropriation of mobility to 
Europe by crossing the Mediterranean in often overcrowded boats. 
  
appropriate a visa by providing manipulated documents and consular staff trying to detect these 
attempts. It is through the study of  embodied encounters with the actors, means and 
methods of control that these conflictive dialogues of action can be investigated (Scheel 2013b). 
In these conflictive dialogues of action migrants confront devices, actors and methods of 
surveillance and control that constitute recuperated forms of previously successful practices of 
appropriation. One visa section head cites the employment of local staff, who can tell if the 
appearance, statements and behaviour of an applicant correspond to her claimed socioeconomic 
standing, as an important safeguard against the use of manipulated supporting documents. This 
control measure underlines the importance of impression management in the interview situation. 
If applicants claim to hold a higher socioeconomic position than they actually have, they need to 
dress up and prepare for possible questions in regards to their claimed profession. A salesman in a 
shabby business suit who purports to do business in Europe without speaking a single word of 
French or English or knowing the price of the goods he purports to purchase will not be believed. 
Migrants who try to appropriate a visa by providing manipulated or falsified supporting documents 
have to maintain a strict   with the script of the fictitious biography their 
documents are meant to support: They should 'not commit unmeant gestures or faux pas in 
performing it' and should be able cope with 'dramaturgical contingencies as they arise', such as an 
unexpected question from consular staff (Goffman 1959: 216). 
Any incoherency between  fictitious biographies and their appearance, 
statements and behavior in the interview may prompt consular staff to engage in additional 
background checks. In case of doubt, consular staff may call banks, universities and employers to 
verify the information provided by employment contracts, certificates and bank statements (Spire 
2009: 93). Staff at consulate Z, in turn, verify the  social security records to check the 
  
information given on bank statements, employment contracts and payslips. Each day M sends a 
list of social security numbers from cases that have raised his suspicions to the local administration 
to verify that the information on the social security records provided is correct and corresponds to 
an  claimed income. Some member states also send specially trained border guards who 
use UV lamps, magnifying cameras and forgery detectors to check passports and supporting 
documents for traces of manipulation and falsification. If they detect manipulated or falsified 
supporting documents, the respective visa application will automatically be refused. In addition, 
consular staff may add the applicant  name to the so-called 'black list'.13 
The stance that it is  practices of appropriation that initiate a relation of 
irreconcilable conflict between migration and the attempts to control it permits to read these means 
and methods of mobility control as attempts to recuperate  practices of appropriation. It 
is migrants' attempts to appropriate Schengen visa and the struggles that these attempts initiate that 
force European border regime into a permanent process of reorganisation (Papadopoulos et al. 
2008: 77-80). The European border regime emerges as an apparatus of capture that tries to 
recuperate migrants' practices of appropriation in order to convert them into a driving force of its 
own development (Shukaitis 2009: 37). More precisely, this vast security dispositif tries to harness 
new forms of knowledge, sociality and creativity engrained in  practices of appropriation. 
From this follows, first, that  practices of appropriation are enmeshed in a dynamic of 
subversion of and recuperation by the security dispositif, in which the relation of conflict they 
institute within the security dispositif manifests. Secondly, this stance requires contemporary 
                                                 
13 Keeping   of applicants who have breached the visa  rules is not foreseen by the CCV. According 
to M, each consulate keeps its own   While visa sections inform each other about  applicants, it is 
at the discretion of each  staff to decide whether to add a particular applicant to their   M could 
not tell me how many names were on consular  'black list' as he could neither evaluate the list statistically nor 
delete any names from it. Consequently, M sometimes sees hits in the 'black list', which is searched automatically by 
the software when he processes a visa application, that were entered more than ten years ago by his precursor.
  
modes of border control to be conceived of as recuperated forms of previously successful practices 
of appropriation (Shukaitis 2009: 48). In this way, the notion of appropriation permits scholars to 
show, to paraphrase Toni Negri, that it is  means of a continual theft of the [knowledge] 
generated by   that the security dispositif  increasingly complex 
mechanisms of  (2005 [1982]).14 It is thus better equipped than the notion of agency 
with its structure-agency divide and the inherently reactive concept of resistance to capture the 
constitutive role that practices of subversion and dissent by the governed play in the transformation 
of regimes of government.  
Yet, despite the introduction of ever more sophisticated methods of control and ever more 
pervasive security technologies like the VIS there exists one form of manipulated feeder 
documents that are, in the words of consular staff,  impossible to  In the country I 
visited they are known as vrais faux  which one can roughly translate with   Since 'the 
secret is to look good on paper', people may ask a friend or relative who owns a company to 'hire' 
them in order to obtain the employment contract and payslips required for a successful visa 
application, Anas tells me over coffee. 'What you need is a skilled job, like an engineer, a teacher 
or a receptionist in a large hotel', before adding: 'many people do that'. The existence of this 
practice is confirmed by J when I ask her about the authentication of supporting documents. 'Many 
people ask a friend or relative to provide them with an employment contract. These   
are nearly impossible to detect, because they are essentially originals ].'15 
                                                 
14 This reading the security dispositif as an apparatus of capture is in line with  analysis of the history of 
the arts of government. In his discussion of heretical practices diverging from Church doctrine Foucault argues for 
example that  counter-conducts  have been continually re-utilised, re-implanted and taken up again in one 
or another  by the Church, which  to  adapt them for its own  (2007: 214-215).
15 In fact, this practice seems to exist in many countries. In her research on consular practices in Senegal, Francesca 
Zampagni mentions the practice of issuing employment contracts to friends and relatives (2011: 23).   also 
feature in a newspaper article on the appropriation of Schengen visas in Ivory Coast (Allou 2011). The practice of 
  
Even if consular staff call the company that has issued the documents they will not discover 
that the applicant is only employed on paper since the person answering the phone will confirm all 
the information in the documents. Similarly, a request at the social security office will not reveal 
the employment as fictitious, because the friend who 'employs' the person who requires an 
employment contract is required by law to pay social security contributions for her 'employee'. In 
practice, the latter would reimburse her 'employer' for the monthly contributions. Hence, the social 
security records provided by a fictitiously employed applicant are just as 'real' as her employment 
contract and her payslips: all these documents are originals, issued by actually existing companies 
and administrations, but the employment relation they support is fictitious. 
What the appropriation of Schengen visa through   demonstrates is that identity 
remains a  (Groebner 2004: 182) despite attempts to render  bodies a means 
of mobility control through the introduction of biometric databases. The VIS does not help to 
verify the authenticity of the supporting documents upon which the decision to issue a biometric 
Schengen visa is based (Muller 2010: 19). Ultimately, the appropriation of Schengen visas through 
the provision of   in the context of VIS confirms that biometric recognition systems are 
haunted by the very problem they are meant to solve, because  foreseeable system will be 
based on exactly the document-based methods of identification upon which biometrics are 
supposed to be an  (Gold 2012: 11). 
The fact that this play with identities is still possible in the context of biometric border 
controls illustrates, in turn, that moments of uncontrollability of migratory practices, that is 
moments of autonomy of migration, emerge, ironically, when migrants stage a convincing 
                                                 
drawing up  contracts  for friends or relatives to facilitate the issuing of a visa, though the persons 
concerned are not actually  is also mentioned in a handbook on the issuance of Schengen visa that has been 
published by the EC (2010: 57).
  
performance of compliance with the Schengen visa  formal and informal requirements. 
The provision of manipulated documents that are nearly impossible to detect has to be 
complemented by a credible imitation of the dress codes, behaviours and biographical features of 
the bona fide travellers aspiring migrants purport to be. In these performances of compliance with 
the  of bona fide travellers it becomes intelligible why practices of appropriation derive 
their efficacy not from open resistance against the Schengen visa regime and its discriminating 
requirements but from their clandestine subversion, from hollowing them out from the inside.  
Paradoxically, it is in these performances of docile compliance that the political quality of 
practices of appropriation comes to the fore: by staging a performance of feigned compliance with 
formal rules and informal criteria, migrants take what these rules and criteria are meant to deprive 
them of: access to mobility. The crucial point is that migrants self-authorise themselves to take the 
resources (not rights)16 border regimes seek to deprive them of without and instead of claiming 
them from someone. It is this moment of self-authorisation that bestows practices of appropriation, 
and this is their fifth shared feature, with an irreducible political quality. Though migrants try to 
avoid attracting any attention when they appropriate mobility via Schengen visa, they nevertheless 
render border controls, and the legally codified forms of citizenship and the socio-economic status 
quo border controls are meant to establish and maintain, as objects of contestation and dissent. 
Instead of openly opposing restrictive migration regulations and related mechanisms of control, 
practices of appropriation challenge border controls by staging credible performances of the scripts 
                                                 
16 I speak of resources instead of rights here to stress that migrants appropriating mobility do not assert any claims to 
entitlements like freedom of movement, but rather take material and immaterial goods like mobility that are withheld 
from them. While the language of rights invokes an authority that recognises and grants rights claimed by subjects, 
the notion of resources, understood as  or immaterial goods that can be drawn on by a person or organisation 
to function  (Oxford English dictionary) immediately links practices of appropriation with debates on the 
commons. This is, however, not to say that rights, understood as claims to entitlements that are the subject of 
contestations and struggles, are completely absent from practices of appropriation. Just as laws are rearticulated and 
mobilised as tactics for the conduct of conduct by the arts of government (Foucault 2007: 99), rights might be 
mobilised and rearticulated as tactics for the appropriation of resources by the governed. 
  
of mobile subjectivities like middle-class tourists or business people, whose  are regarded 
as devoid of any 'migration risk'. Thereby, migrants erode the informal criteria that guide the 
decisions of consular staff, ultimately, plunging the Schengen visa regime in an epistemic crisis. 
Since   are nearly impossible to detect, consular staff can no longer tell whether they are 
dealing with a 'real' or a 'fake' tourist, student or businessman, because the supporting documents 
provided may not only be 'fake' or 'real', but could also be real fakes'. 
Yet, the appropriation of a Schengen visa through the provision of   and the 
successful imitation of the appearance of a bona fide traveller does not signify an unequivocal 
 of migrants over biometric border control technologies. Rather, it underscores the 
irreducible ambivalence of practices of appropriation as their sixth and final feature.  
What makes practices of appropriation ambivalent is their inseparably intertwined with the 
means, and methods of mobility control. The re-coding of the devices, actors, operational logics 
and effects of mobility control in means of appropriation implies concessions, compromises and 
side-effects which may prove to be detrimental for migrants and their migration projects in the 
long run. Migrants cannot completely usurp the means and methods of control for their own 
purposes. Due to these concessions, compromises and side-effects, practices of appropriation 
always result in partial, contested, and polyvalent outcomes that imply further struggles over the 
appropriation of mobility, whereby each of these struggles features its own set of sites, actors and 
stakes. It is thus the irreducible ambivalence of  practices of appropriation that inserts a 
self-perpetuating dynamic into  struggles over mobility to Europe. The final paragraph 
of the visa application form, above the field reserved for the  signature, is indicative of 
this self-perpetuating dynamic: 
 
  
I undertake to leave the territory of the Member States before the expiry of the visa, if granted. I have 
been informed that possession of a visa is only one of the prerequisites for entry into the European 
territory of the Member States. The mere fact that a visa has been granted to me does not mean that I 
will be entitled to compensation if I fail to comply with the relevant provisions of Article 5(1) of 
Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 (Schengen Borders Code) and I am therefore refused entry. The 
prerequisites for entry will be checked again on entry into the European territory of the Member States 
(as cited in: EP and Council 2009b: 29). 
 
What the statement that a visa does not guarantee entry to the Schengen area indicates is that the 
successful appropriation of a Schengen visa leads to another struggle over the selective denial and 
direct appropriation of mobility. This struggle takes places upon arrival at the external border of 
the Schengen area and revolves around the conditions of entry. The first line of the paragraph 
indicates, in contrast, that migrants will face further struggles over mobility and other resources 
after a successful border crossing. The appropriation of mobility via Schengen visa results in a 
compromise as it also implies  disenfranchisement by the border regime: living and 
working in Europe is now possible, but only under the precarious and contested conditions of 
illegality (Karakayali and Tsianos 2005). After the expiration of their visas migrants become 
illegal  rendering the entire Schengen area a vast borderzone crisscrossed by struggles revolving 
around the appropriation of various resources such as an income, housing, access to health care 
and a permanent residence title. In these struggles the appropriation of mobility remains contested 
and preliminary as long as migrants are haunted by their data doubles that were created when they 
initially applied for a Schengen visa and that are stored in VIS in order to facilitate their re-
identification and deportation in case of detection by authorities. It is this self-perpetuating 
dynamic of  struggles over the appropriation of mobility and other resources that makes 
  
the relation of conflict  initiate within the security dispositif an irreconcilable conflict 
between migration and attempts to control it.   
 
Conclusion 
 Starting from the observation that the central role of Schengen visa regime in the 
illegalisation of migration as well as in the appropriation of mobility to Europe has not been 
sufficiently acknowledged so far, I have engaged this complex security dispositif from the 
perspective of those whose mobility it is meant to assess and control. Drawing on the provision of 
manipulated or falsified supporting documents as an example, I have shown, and this was the first 
objective of this chapter, that it is still possible to appropriate mobility to Europe via Schengen 
visa in context of biometric border controls. The adoption of the perspective of mobility has 
allowed me to show, moreover, that these and other practices of appropriation are provoked by the 
Schengen visa regime itself. The latter constitutes a vast machine of illegalisation that, besides 
creating an artificial scarcity of access to mobility to Europe by setting requirements for a visa that 
do not correspond to local circumstances, entices applicants to engage in criminalised practices 
like   or document fraud  in order to increase the prospects of success for their 
application. While the provision of manipulated feeder documents emerges as a tactic of aspiring 
travellers and migrants that is necessary in order to appropriate mobility within and against an 
unpredictable regime of institutionalised distrust, these and other practices of appropriation are 
framed in terms of delinquency by border control authorities as instances of  and  
In this way  attempts to appropriate Schengen visa are mobilised as evidence for the 
alleged need to implement more and better security technologies, like the VIS, a dynamic that 
Michel Foucault (1980 [1977]: 195) has called the   of the security dispositif. 
  
I could only briefly indicate this dynamic here by characterising the Schengen visa regime as an 
apparatus of capture that tries to recuperate  practices of appropriation in order to render 
them as a driving force for its own development. Thereby, I have tried to show that the notion of 
appropriation is better equipped than the inherently reactive concept of resistance to account for 
the constitutive role that practices of subversion and dissent by the governed play in the 
transformation of regimes of government. It also better captures the intricate entanglement of 
practices of contestation with those of surveillance, government and control than the notion of 
 with its structure-agency divide. In order to introduce the notion of appropriation as an 
alternative concept for the theorisation of  practices of subversion, and this was the 
second objective of this chapter, I have used the provision of manipulated supporting documents 
as an example to outline six features that practices of appropriation share irrespective of their form. 
Hopefully, this conception will provide a useful tool to intervene in  mostly silent, but 
inherently political struggles over mobility and other resources by showing that it are the 
operational logics of  ever more pervasive border regimes that provoke the very phenomena 
they are designed to combat and forestall. 
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